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Abstract 
This paper examines the incidents of recent high-profile corporate failure in the UK in 
the light of corporate governance reforms focussing on three areas of corporate 
governance, i.e. board failure, inaccurate accounting and directors’ remuneration. 
 
Introduction 
The rate of corporate failure in the UK has been increasing at an alarming rate in 
recent years with one in every 213 companies falling into liquidation in 20171. Official 
figures released recently by the Insolvency Service in the fourth quarter of 2019 
show that there were 17,196 underlying company insolvencies in 2019, a 6.8% 
increase on 2018 and the highest level of underlying insolvencies since 20132, 
although this represents a 1.8% decrease in the last quarter of 2019 after a rise in 
the three consecutive quarters between 2018 and 20193. The Insolvency Service 
attributes this rapid increase to an increase in underlying creditors’ voluntary 
                                                          
*Dr Edwin Mujih, Senior Lecturer in Law, London Metropolitan University, London. 
This paper was presented as a working paper at the 17
th
 International Conference on Corporate Social 
Responsibility organised by the Social Responsibility Research Network in Bangalore, India in September 2018. 
I am grateful to London Metropolitan University for retrospectively funding my participation at the conference 
and in particular to Professor Klaus Fischer for his help in obtaining the funding. 
1
 Lucy Burton, ‘Number of British Businesses Going Bust Hits Four-year High’ (The Telegraph, 26 January 2018), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2018/01/26/number-british-businesses-going-bust-hits-four-year-
high/. Accessed 13 August 2018 
2
 The Insolvency Service, Company insolvency statistics, Q4 October to December 2019, Released 30 January 
2020, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/861187/
Commentary_-_Company_Insolvency_Statistics_Q4_2019.pdf p. 7. Assessed 25 April 2020. See also, 
http://www.gov.uk/government/collections/insolvency-service-official-statistics; and 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2018/01/26/number-british-businesses-going-bust-hits-four-year-
high/. Accessed 13 August 2018. 
3
 Company insolvency statistics, Q4 October to December 2019, Ibid, p. 8. 
Company Lawyer – 0144-1027 
 
liquidations.4 In the past few years, there have been reports of high-profile corporate 
failures every year. In fact, such failures now appear to be a common feature of the 
corporate world in the UK.  
The collapse of Carillion in January 2018 is said to be the biggest corporate 
collapse in the country for a decade. It sent shockwaves in the corporate world which 
reverberated across many sectors in the UK and also abroad, given that the 
company had operations in many industries in the UK and abroad. The collapse of 
Carillion came on the heels of other high-profile corporate failures such as BHS. 
And, hot on the heels of Carillion were other high-profile corporate failures such as 
British Steel in May 2019 and Thomas Cook, the British travel firm, in September 
2019. And, the current coronavirus pandemic is likely to lead to more corporate 
failures. But the impact of the pandemic on corporate governance is not the subject 
of this paper. Perhaps what is worrying is that in many cases, these failures are 
usually preceded by the publication of good accounting records for the company 
giving it a clean bill of health. This alone should raise questions about the state of 
corporate governance or the effectiveness of corporate governance reform in the 
country.  
At the same time, there has been regular corporate governance reform in the 
country since the first review of corporate governance issues, the Cadbury Report, 
was published in 1992. It is well-known that the Cadbury Report led the way for 
corporate governance reform not only in the UK but in other countries around the 
world. Many countries have chosen to model their corporate governance codes on 
the UK Corporate Governance Code, with some variations to take into account local 
realities. The Cadbury Report, which laid the foundation for corporate governance 
reform in the UK, was incorporated with subsequent reports into a Combined Code 
on Corporate Governance published in 1998. The Combined Code has been revised 
several times and has been known as the UK Corporate Governance Code since 
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20095. Since then, the Code has been updated virtually every two years. The Code 
supplements statutory rules such as those contained in the Companies Act 2006.  
It is a matter of curiosity that these corporate failures come against the 
background of such regular reforms. It is well-known that the UK has been at the 
forefront of corporate governance reform in the world since the publication of the 
Cadbury Report in 1992, which encourages listed companies to comply with the 
principles of the Code or explain why they are not complying – known as “comply or 
explain|”. And, the number of companies supposedly complying with the Code has 
been increasing since it was first published. Writing in 2018, Lowe revealed that 
sixty-six percent of the FTSE 350 complied with the Code then, compared to 36% in 
2002, when the first FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review was launched.6 So 
why are companies failing despite corporate governance reforms? Or is it the case 
that companies will always fail and therefore no amount of corporate governance 
reform could ever, even remotely, impact on the number of corporate failures 
however effective such reforms might be? This paper examines the reasons for 
corporate failure vis-à-vis regulatory changes with the view to determining the 
effectiveness of corporate governance reform in the UK. It is proposed to begin with 
a brief history of corporate governance in the UK. 
 
1. A Brief History of UK Corporate Governance: From Cadbury to 
the UKCG Code 2016 
A history of UK corporate governance is necessary here in order to provide a 
background for the ensuing discussion. However, it is proposed to be brief as 
readers will presumably be all too familiar with the subject.  
Following a series of high-profile corporate failures in the UK in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, the private sector initiated a series of reforms to improve 
transparency and accountability in corporate governance. The first was the Cadbury 
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Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance set up by the London 
Stock Exchange, the Financial Reporting Council and accountancy professions to 
report on financial aspects of corporate governance. The Committee published a 
Report in 1992 that came to be known as the ‘Cadbury Report’ The Report 
recommended, among other things, a Code of best practice to be complied with by 
the board of listed companies as a condition of continued listing.7 The Cadbury 
Report formed the basis for future corporate governance reform in the UK and 
influenced the development of many corporate governance Codes around the world. 
Some of the reports published after Cadbury focused on specific aspects of 
corporate governance, all with the overall objective of improving accountability and 
transparency in corporate governance. For example, the Greenbury Report 1995 
focused on directors’ remuneration and their disclosure; the Hampel Report 1998 
reviewed the implementation of the Cadbury and Greenbury recommendations 
focusing on directors’ remuneration, the role of both executive and non-executive 
directors as well as the role of shareholders and auditors in corporate governance; 
the Combined Code 1998 drew together the recommendations of the Cadbury, 
Greenbury and Hampel Reports. The Turnbull Report 1999 provided guidance on 
the implementation of the internal control requirements of the Combine Code.8 The 
Higgs Review 2003 reported on the role and effectiveness of non-executive 
directors; the Smith Review 2003, clarified the important role of the audit committee. 
The revised Combined Code 2003 replaced the Combined Code issued by Hampel 
in 1998.9 The Code incorporated the substance of the Higgs and Smith Reviews.10 
The Combine Code was updated in 2006 and again in 2008 following an extensive 
review by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC).11 The 2008 Code introduced two 
changes to the 2006 Code which had itself introduced three main changes to the 
2003 Code. The Code, now known as the UK Corporate Governance Code, was 
further revised in 2010 and has been updated every two years to ensure it stays 
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relevant.12 The most recent one is the UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 – the 
focus of this paper. The UK Corporate Governance Code has served as a 
benchmark for international best practice. 
 
 
2. Reasons for Corporate Failings 
As noted at the beginning of this paper, there has been a series of high-profile 
corporate collapses in the UK in recent years, despite a regular review of the 
Corporate Governance Code. In fact, corporate governance reforms are largely a 
response to these corporate failings going back to the Cadbury Code. Commonly 
cited reasons for corporate failure include: fraud,13 mismanagement, accounting 
irregularities, failure of the board to anticipate or address the risks facing the 
company,14 economic distress15 and excessive remuneration of corporate 
executives. These reasons can be classified under the five main principles of the 
Corporate Governance Code – suggesting a correlation between breach of the 
principles and corporate failure and raising questions about the level of compliance 
with the Code. It is proposed to continue by examining three of the above reasons, 
with the aid of empirical data, insofar as they are covered by the principles of the 
Code. They are: board failure, accountability, and directors’ remuneration. It is worth 
noting that these corporate governance principles are also supplemented by 
legislation such as the Companies Act 2006. For example, directors’ general duties 
is covered in part 10 chapter 2. This is in addition to directors’ specific duties which 
pervades much of the Act. Accounts and reports is covered in part 15, while part 15 
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chapter 6 of the Act imposes a duty on directors of quoted and traded companies to 
prepare a directors’ remuneration report, a breach of which is a criminal offence. 
 
2.1. Board Failure 
The Board of directors plays an important role in the governance of the company. It 
can be described as the nerve-centre of the company. Among other things, it 
oversees the overall functioning of and provides direction for the company in virtually 
every area of corporate life.16 It is perhaps for this reason that the Code pays more 
attention to the board than to other areas of corporate governance. In fact, the Board 
is charged with the responsibility of applying all the five principles of the Code 
ranging from leadership to remuneration in the case of the 2018 Code and 
leadership to relations with shareholders in the case of the 2016 Code. 
Unsurprisingly, when things go wrong for the company, the board is often to blame. 
Board failure has often been identified as a major reason not only for 
corporate collapses such as Enron and Carillion,17 but also for failings in the banking 
sector. For example, Hannigan reveals that following the financial crisis in 2008, Her 
Majesty’s Treasury concluded that failure by the board to probe and understand their 
firms’ risk management processes, poor management decisions, among others 
contributed to the crisis. Similarly, the European Commission observed that board 
failure to ultimately control “the risks to which their financial institutions were exposed 
lay at the heart of the origins of the crisis”.18 More recently, a report by the business, 
energy and industrial strategy (BEIS) and work and pension on the collapse of 
Carillion, blamed “greed among the company’s board members and a rotten 
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corporate culture.”19 The collapse of Carillion led to claims that the board failed to 
adequately manage the company’s risk by allowing it to take high debts while trading 
on low margins and that the board also failed to grasp the company’s contract risk 
management.20  
The UK Corporate Governance Code emphasises the importance of the 
company being governed by an effective board of directors that is responsible for the 
long-term success of the company. This principle, like many corporate governance 
principles, has its roots in the Cadbury Report which recommended that the board be 
split between executive directors and non-executive directors to make it more 
effective and that the non-executive directors (NEDs) be appointed by the board 
rather than senior management in order to ensure their independence. The role of 
executive directors and NEDs was reviewed by the Greenbury Committee and 
emphasised in the subsequent Codes. For example, the Main Principles of Section 
A1 (which defines the role of the board) of the 2012, 2014 and 2016 Codes provides 
that “every company should be headed by an effective board which is collectively 
responsible for the long-term success of the company”. The Main Principle of section 
A.4, which deals with the role of NEDs, encourages them to effectively challenge and 
help develop proposals on strategy.  
It is clear that board effectiveness and accountability are important principles 
in the Corporate Governance Code. Principle C2 of the 2016 Code which is 
replicated as Principle O of the 2018 Code requires the board to maintain sound risk 
management and internal control systems. Following the collapse of Carillion, the 
head of governance at the institute of directors said “effective governance was 
lacking at Carillion.”21  
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2.1.1. An Empirical Analysis of Board Failure: Surface Compliance to conceal 
In-depth Defiance? 
It is a matter of curiosity that board failure or the lack of board effectiveness should 
be a major reason for corporate collapse, when generally speaking, the corporate 
world has always been receptive to corporate governance reform in the UK and 
seem to be complying with the provisions of the Corporate Governance Code as 
seen above. Following the financial crisis in 2008, Hannigan observed that “on 
paper, looking at the domestic United Kingdom banking defaulters and failures, such 
as Northern Rock, HBOS, and Royal Bank of Scotland, all had boards with the 
obligatory mix of executive and non-executive directors, all had remuneration, audit 
and nomination committees, all operated in compliance with respected Codes of 
corporate governance, as their annual reports confirmed. But the reality, as HM 
Treasury concluded, “was widespread corporate governance failures by these 
boards, particularly in understanding and probing their firms' risk management 
processes.”22 The European Commission considered that the failure of boards to 
identify, understand and ultimately control the risks to which their financial institutions 
were exposed lay at the heart of the origins of the crisis.  
On paper, these organisations had complied with the provisions of the 
Corporate Governance Code, the Stewardship Code and other regulatory 
instruments largely by ticking the boxes. However, the reality was different. In many 
cases, companies went into insolvency after the publication of glowing reports about 
their performance. For example, in its 2016 annual report Carillion noted that the 
evaluation had “confirmed that the board, each of its committees and the directors 
continue to be highly effective.”23 One year after the publication, the company 
collapsed with board failure at least partly to blame despite its experience24. This 
raises the question of why companies that are said to have complied with the 
Principles of the Code are found to have compliance issues after they collapse.  
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As is well-known, the Code offers flexibility in implementation and operates on 
a comply or explain basis. Comply or explain means that listed companies may 
either comply with the principles and guidelines of the Code or explain why they 
have not complied. The flexibility offered in the implementation of the Code means 
that in many cases, companies choose to comply with the Principles by ticking the 
box. But box-ticking has its problems. The paradox is that box-ticking which focuses 
on complying with the letter of the Code is an offshoot of the much-vaunted flexibility 
offered by the FRC25 to companies as a way of applying the spirit of the Principles. In 
other words, the FRC believed that flexibility would enable companies to comply with 
the spirit of the Principles. However, flexibility had the opposite effect of enabling 
companies to adopt the box-ticking approach and comply with the letter of the 
Principles only. Paradoxically, this is a realisation of Cadbury’s fears, when 
expressing his preference for a voluntary code, that statutory measures would 
impose a minimum standard and there would be a greater risk of boards complying 
with the letter rather than the spirit of their requirements.26 As argued elsewhere, 
box-ticking amounts to surface compliance as the company is only concerned with 
applying the letter of the Code, whereas compliance is in-depth when the company 
applies the spirit of the Code.27 It is significant that in the 2018 Code, the FRC 
advocated the use of high-quality reporting on the Provisions of the Code in the 
application of the Principles, cautioned companies against box-ticking and again 
reiterated the importance of applying the spirit of the Code. This shows an 
awareness of the prevailing corporate practice of box-ticking and compliance with 
the letter rather than the spirit of the Code. 
A robust monitoring mechanism to ensure real compliance with the Code 
might have prevented this situation where companies inaccurately reported 
compliance with the provisions of the Code. This reflects the failure by companies to 
implement the spirit of the Code despite ostensibly welcoming corporate governance 
reforms.  
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2.2. Inaccurate Accounting 
Accounting is an important element in the Corporate Governance Code. It has 
featured prominently as one of the main corporate governance principles going back 
to the Cadbury report. One of the recommendations of Cadbury was that directors 
should make a statement in the report and accounts on the effectiveness of their 
system of internal control and that the auditors should report thereon.28 As 
mentioned earlier, the Code complements and in many instances reinforces existing 
statutory duties imposed on directors. For example, Cadbury reiterates the need for 
directors to maintain a system of internal control over the financial management of 
the company in order to meet their responsibilities under part 15, chapter 2 of the 
Companies Act 2006.29 
 
2.2.1. An Empirical Analysis of Inaccurate Accounting 
Unfortunately, inaccurate accounting, lack of internal controls and misleading audit 
caused by a limited remit of auditors have often been cited as major reasons for the 
collapse of many companies. This suggests that the provisions of the Code in 
relation to accounting are not fully complied with. For example, the failure of a 
company to adequately manage its risk and handle annual reporting and accounts 
could be said to be a breach of section C of the 2016 Code which contains three 
main principles of accountability. The main principle for section C.1 requires the 
board to present a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of the company’s 
position and prospects. Section C is reproduced in an abridged form as section 4 of 
the 2018 Code entitled “Audit, Risk and internal Control”. The three main principles 
for section C.1 are listed as principles M, N, and O in the 2018 Code. The main 
principle for C.1 is reproduced as principle N, while principle O requires the board to 
establish procedures to manage risks, among others in other to achieve the 
company’s long-term strategic objective. 
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Of the reasons cited for the corporate failure, misleading audit appears to play 
a lead role as an accurate audit will pick up deficiencies in accounting and internal 
control systems. At a launch of a new inquiry examining the future of audit in 
November 2018, the Chair of the Business, Energy and Industrial Service 
Committee, Honourable Rachel Reeves said the audit market is broken. She said:  
Misleading audits have been at the heart of corporate failures over recent 
decades. Recent accounting scandals at BHS, Carillion, and at Patisserie 
Valerie have shown accounts bearing closer resemblance to works of fiction 
than an accurate reflection of the true financial performance of the business. 
Repeated accounting failures have contributed to the collapse of major 
businesses and undermined public and investor confidence.30 
A common example of accounting failures is where the company’s account is signed 
off prior to it going into insolvency. EY, the new auditors for Thomas Cook, signed off 
the company’s last set of account for 2018 prior to it becoming insolvent in 
September 2019.31 Such practices commonly arise where the company uses the 
same firm of auditors for many years. In addition to giving rise to feelings of loyalty, 
this practice can gradually compromise the independence and objectivity of the firm 
and could eventually lead to the auditors being found complicit with the failed 
company. Such was the case with Carillion, which bears a striking similarity with the 
case of the failed USA company, Enron, and its firm of accountants Author Anderson 
both of which collapsed at the turn of the millennium. The same accusation of 
auditors’ complicity in Thomas Cook’s downfall was levied against PwC, auditors of 
Thomas Cook and EY the firm which replaced PwC in 2017. A Parliamentary inquiry 
into the collapse of the company found that Thomas Cook paid PwC up to £21m in 
consultancy fee between 2007 and 2016.32  
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According to another Parliamentary report33 on the collapse of Carillion, the 
Financial Reporting Council first raised concerns about the company’s future in 2015 
while conducting a regular review of the company’s account.34 “The FRC highlighted 
12 potential problems with Carillion’s books, ranging from a lack of clarity in goodwill 
assumptions to a non-existent explanation on the major decline in Carillion’s book-to-
bill ratio” and gave warnings of a potential profit shortfall.35 Yet the company’s 
account continued to be signed off until March 2017, when Carillion itself issued 
profits warnings.36 The company went into liquidation less than a year later in 
January 2018 with debts of £1.5bn. The Board’s insufficient handling of annual 
reporting and accounts was seen as a major reason for the company’s collapse. The 
Parliamentary Report raised questions about the independence and objectivity of 
KPMG, Carillion’s auditor, given that they were the company’s auditors for all 19 
years of its existence from 1999, although it noted that this was within the 20 year 
statutory maximum period within which companies must change their auditors.37 In a 
critical statement, the Report stated that: 
KPMG audited Carillion for 19 years, pocketing £29 million in the process. Not 
once during that time did they qualify their audit opinion on the financial 
statements, instead signing off the figures put in front of them by the 
company’s directors. Yet, had KPMG been prepared to challenge 
management, the warning signs were there in highly questionable 
assumptions about construction contract revenue and the intangible asset of 
goodwill accumulated in historic acquisitions. These assumptions were 
fundamental to the picture of corporate health presented in audited annual 
accounts.  In failing to exercise and voice professional scepticism towards 
Carillion’s aggressive accounting judgements, KPMG was complicit in them.38 
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It is clear that accounting failures contribute to corporate failures. Perhaps it is in 
recognition of this link and its importance that measures are being introduced to 
improve the quality of accounting and auditing. For example in July 2019, the FRC 
proposed to issue new, revised ethical standards with effect from 15 December 
2019. This follows a consultation on revisions to ethical and auditing standards which 
was issued in July 2019.39 In December 2018, the government appointed Sir Donald 
Brydon to conduct a review into the quality and effectiveness of audits.40 The Brydon 
Report was submitted in December 2019. 
Accurate accounting requires transparency in financial records, which was absent 
in Carillion’s case. Inaccurate accounting could result from negligence or corruption 
and in either case the company directors should be held accountable.  As observed 
by Schipani, accountability is an obligation of corporate directors and officers to be 
held responsible for their actions, and is inherently related to transparency 
measures.41 But to meet this obligation, there must be mechanisms fostering 
transparency and disclosure.42 Indeed, the FRC concluded in its audit quality review 
inspection reports for 2018/19 that 25% of assessed audits fall below acceptable 
standards. Findings of the Report include the possible factors responsible for audit 
teams failing to challenge company management sufficiently.43 However, things are 
likely to change with the proposed replacement of the FRC with a new body, the 
Audit, Reporting and Governance Authority, (ARGA) which will introduce a  new 
sanction regime of auditors and directors. 
 
 
2.3. Directors’ Remuneration 
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Directors’ remuneration has been one of the most controversial corporate 
governance issues in the past three decades. Regulators have sought to resolve this 
thorny issue by introducing more disclosure requirements through corporate 
governance rules and company law with the effect of giving shareholders a role on 
directors’ remuneration. Shareholders in the UK have been entitled to an advisory 
vote on directors’ remuneration since 2002.44 This is intended to enable them to 
influence directors’ remuneration and give them a role in corporate governance. The 
question will be examined later as to whether shareholders have exercised this right 
and if so whether this has had an impact on the thorny issue of directors’ 
remuneration. The Corporate Governance Code provides clear guidelines on 
directors’ remuneration. Principle P of the 2018 Code requires remuneration policies 
to promote long-term sustainable success and directors’ remuneration to be clearly 
linked to the successful delivery of the company’s long-term strategy. Principle R 
requires directors to take account of the company and individual performance as well 
as wider circumstances when authorising remuneration outcome. Provision 40 of the 
Code recommends that the remuneration committee should engage with 
shareholders and the workforce when determining executive director remuneration 
policy. The 2018 Code echoes earlier codes such as the Greenbury Report which 
recommended that remuneration should be linked explicitly to performance. 
As with accounting rules, the Code’s provisions on directors’ remuneration 
complements statutory rules. For example, the Principle P requirement to promote 
the long-term success of the company replicates the duty of directors under section 
172 of the Companies Act 2006. The Provision 40 recommendation to engage with 
shareholders mirrors further provisions of the 2006 Act. For example, section 420 of 
the Act imposes a duty on directors’ of quoted companies to prepare a directors’ 
remuneration report. Under section 423, a copy of the annual accounts and report 
must be circulated to shareholders and other stakeholders.45 Over the years, the 
government has introduced additional reporting requirements to encourage 
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companies to be more transparent about directors’ remuneration. Examples include 
the Directors’ Remuneration Reporting Regulations 2013 which brought in new rules 
giving shareholders a binding vote on directors’ remuneration.46 A more recent 
example is the Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and 
Reports) Regulations 200847, which have been amended recently by the Companies 
(Directors’ Remuneration Policy and Directors Remuneration Report) Regulation 
2019 to extend the scope of remuneration reporting to unquoted traded companies 
and to introduce new requirements in respect of directors’ remuneration policy and 
remuneration report.48 The Regulations implement Articles 9a and 9b of the 
European Directive 2017/82/EC, commonly known as the Revised Shareholder 
Rights Directive.49 They apply to company reporting on financial years starting on or 
after 10 June 2019. 
These provisions give shareholders rights over directors’ remuneration. As 
seen below, shareholders have recently been exercising these rights as corporate 
failures have brought corporate governance issues such as directors’ remuneration 
to the limelight. These instruments have heightened disclosure requirements by, 
inter alia, removing the board’s former discretion in respect of holding a vote and 
giving shareholders a voice on directors’ remuneration.50 In short, the rules require 
companies to put their remuneration policies to a binding shareholder vote at their 
AGM.51 However, the question as to whether statutory rules have succeeded in 
aligning directors’ remuneration and corporate performance has, generally, been 
answered in the negative.52 In fact, some commentators take the view that disclosure 
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has had the opposite effect of raising the level of directors’ remuneration. According 
to Howard, Greenbury's disclosure requirements helped raise average pay by 
revealing peer earnings, and companies were not presenting pay reports to 
shareholders for approval.53  
 
2.3. 1. An Empirical Analysis of Directors’ Remuneration: Link with 
Performance 
Empirical data suggest that the requirement that directors’ remuneration should be 
linked to performance has not always been observed in the corporate world and 
examples abound where directors receive excessive pay rises or huge bonuses 
when their companies are in financial crises and sometimes laying off employees. A 
recent example makes the point. In November 2019, shareholders of Kier Group plc, 
a leading UK construction and infrastructure services company, revolted over the 
company’s plan to pay its CEO more than £1m in bonuses despite disastrous profit 
warnings and a plunging share price.54 Kier is reported to have paid its board a total 
of £2.1m in the year to June 2019, when the company reported losses of £245m. 
Although the £2.1m payment was a significant drop from the £5.5m paid the year 
before, as the company did not pay any bonuses in 2018-19, it came against a 90% 
drop in shares reflecting a fall in its market value from £1bn to £200m during the 
same period.55 At the same time, the company also planned to lay off 1,200 
employees by June 2020, that is over 6% of its workforce. The current developments 
at Kier are a chilling echo of the events that heralded the collapse of Carillion. They 
are a familiar tale of many public companies that have gone into liquidation in the UK 
and carry the tell-tale signs of a company heading in the Carillion direction.  
The link (or lack of a link) between pay and performance has fuelled the 
controversy surrounding directors’ remuneration. In 2004, the Chair of Treasury 
Select Committee criticised the CEO of large insurance companies following an 
executive pay increase of 45-70% after a period of a decline in profitability, 50% drop 
in share prices, 25% loss of endowments saying: “the industry is going down like a 
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slalom skier … why do you think you are worth so much?”56 The increase has 
continued over the years. In a discussion paper on Executive Remuneration 
published in September 2011, the Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 
now the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) revealed 
that the average total pay of FTSE 100 CEOs for the period from 1998-2010 rose 
13.6% year from an average of £1 million to £4.2 million.57 This rise in pay far 
exceeded the 1.7% average annual increase in the FTSE 100 index as well as the 
average remuneration levels for other employees for the same period. During the 
same period, UK employee pay only grew by 4.7%, lifting the multiple of CEO pay 
from 47 times average worker pay to a multiple of 120.58 And, in 2014, the average 
UK CEO remuneration was estimated to be 125 times more than the average 
earnings of an employee.59  
Jenkins observes that while there was an astronomical 330% increase in 
executive pay between 1998 and 2015, average wages, worth £28,000 in 2015 rose 
only about 12% in real terms during the same period.60 As mentioned earlier, the 
2018 Code now requires, in provision 33, that the remuneration committee reviews 
workforce remuneration and take it into account when setting the policy for executive 
directors’ remuneration. Furthermore, the Companies Regulation 2019 now also 
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requires a comparison of the annual change of each director’s pay to the annual 
change in average employee pay over a five year period in traded companies.61 
The former Department for Business Innovation and Skills observed that while 
CEO remuneration rose rapidly in the period above, the link between pay and 
performance was hard to discern.62 One reason is that the complexity of reports 
means that in some cases, the symmetry between remuneration, shareholder return 
and the long-term objectives of the company is lost.63 Research reveals that only 
around a third of the remuneration reports of the FTSE 150 companies clearly 
disclosed how remuneration is dependent on performance.64 
 
2.3. 2. Shareholder Activism over Directors’ Remuneration 
The problem of directors’ excessive remuneration has led to an increase in 
shareholder activism in recent years, apparently to enforce the rights provided to 
them in regulatory instruments such as those examined above. There has been a 
resurgence of shareholder interest in the corporate decision-making process relating 
in particular to director’s remuneration. This renewed interest has revitalised 
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corporate democracy. In July 2018, Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass 
Lewis, the world’s largest and most influential proxy advisers advised shareholders 
of Royal Mail to reject its plan to pay its new CEO a higher salary than that of his 
predecessor.65 In May 2019, investors protests over huge remuneration packages 
and pension contributions led to a pay cut of the CEO of Standard Chartered and the 
resignation of the CEO of Smith & Nephew.66 Similarly, in the same month, in one of 
the biggest rebellions at a FTSE 100 company hitherto, 42% of shareholders at 
Standard Life Aberdeen, the £546 bn UK asset manager, protested against the pay 
of a senior executive and voted against the fund house’s remuneration report.67 This 
is even below the 53.9% of Kier Group shareholders who rejected the pay report of 
the company’s directors a few months later in November 2019.68 The rejection came 
despite the fact that the total pay was down to £2.1m from £5.5m the year before.69 
Still in November 2019, Britain’s most influential investor group, The Investor 
Association, warned the country’s biggest companies to address excessive and 
opaque executive pay deals or face shareholder scrutiny during the 2020 AGM 
season.70 Investors would like to see a greater alignment of pay with long-term 
company strategy in 2020, a recommendation of the Code. Protesting investors have 
generally expressed similar concerns that remuneration is geared at short rather 
than long-term performance and that it exceeded UK market norms.  
 
2.3.3. The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Directors’ Remuneration 
The question that arises is whether recent shareholder activism over directors’ 
remuneration is having an impact. Reports indicate that despite the increase in 
shareholder rebellion, there has been a trend of increased remuneration of non-
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executive directors and chair in 2019.71 And, executive pay is even higher.72 The 
average pay of chairmen of UK’s largest companies is said to have risen by almost a 
third to more than £400,000 since the end of the financial crisis. According to the 
Spencer Stuart Board Index, which analyses the boardrooms for the largest 
companies with a premium listing on the London Stock Exchange, a major reason for 
the increased remuneration is that boards have become more professional in the last 
decade.73 However, as pointed out by what was formerly the Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills, research on the reasons for the growth in pay has 
reached different conclusions, with many studies pointing to the difficulty of 
identifying causal effects. “As a result, no single, clear reason has emerged and the 
trend is likely to be a combination of factors”74. 
Despite the recent incidents of shareholder activism described above, it is 
worth noting that incidents of shareholder activism are still very negligible and, 
overall, remuneration reports receive shareholder approval. It has been seen above 
that companies are legally required to put their remuneration policy to the vote in the 
AGM. In its recent report, the Chartered Institute for Professional Development 
(CIPD) observed that between 2014 and 2018 every single FTSE 100 remuneration 
policy put to the vote at an AGM was approved by shareholders.75 According to the 
analysis, most remuneration packages received more than 90% vote and despite the 
reported incidents of shareholder protests, no remuneration reports were defeated in 
2019 and only six pay packages were defeated between 2014 and 2018.76 Recently, 
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a review carried out by Sir John Kingman77 on the FRC noted that investors are not 
as engaged, particularly in audit and accounting issues, as they should be.78 The 
conclusion that can be drawn so far is that although shareholders’ right in respect of 
directors’ remuneration have been strengthened by regulatory framework and there 
have been incidents of shareholder activism recently, shareholder apathy is still a 
major issue overall.   
 
2.3.4. An Agency Theory Justification of Directors’ Remuneration 
So far, we have analysed the seemingly perennial issue of directors’ remuneration 
with the aid of regulatory instruments and empirical data. However, the analysis 
would be incomplete without a brief reference to corporate legal theory. In fact, the 
controversy surrounding directors’ remuneration makes such a reference not only 
appealing but compelling, perhaps the most compelling corporate governance issue. 
Nevertheless, a detail discussion of corporate law theory is beyond the scope of this 
article and it is certainly not intended to revisit the Berle and Means thesis on the 
separation of ownership and control which sparked the Berle and Dodd debate of the 
1930s. The discussion of directors’ remuneration reveals a conflict between the 
interests of shareholders who personify ownership of the company and directors who 
personify management of the company. This conflict arises from an agency 
relationship which Jensen and Meckling define as a form of contract between 
shareholders and directors.79 The conflict is a practical reflection of the agency 
theory of the firm, a theory which deals with the relationship between the 
shareholders and the directors. A corollary of the agency theory is the agency cost 
theory, that is, the cost that shareholders incur by having managers run the company 
on their behalf. The requirement that executive pay should be linked with 
performance is significant in this regard. Where pay is linked with performance, this 
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can be seen as a justifiable agency cost that shareholders incur by having directors 
run the company on their behalf.  
The friction between directors and shareholders as revealed in the analysis 
above is a reflection of the intricacies of the theory. And, agency theory is based on 
the view that the corporate governance system as seen in the regulatory frameworks 
examined above, (which essentially require directors to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of the members as whole) is designed to minimize the 
agency problem80 and reduce agency cost. But problems arise where directors, as 
agents, take decisions which are perceived not to be for the benefit of the 
shareholders, as principals. Indeed, much mistrust on the reliability or 
trustworthiness of agents such as directors has been expressed in the literature. 
According to Williamson, agents are ‘opportunistic actors given to self-interest 
seeking with guile’.81 Some commentators have proposed the introduction of an 
effective mechanism in the governance system needed to align the agent’s interest 
with those of the principal otherwise directors will have no incentive to maximise the 
interests of shareholders.82 According to Coffee improved accountability “improves 
the behaviour of most individuals”.83  It seems that no other corporate governance 
issue epitomises this conflict more than directors’ excessive remuneration. This is 
more so where the remuneration is perceived not to be linked with performance. 
Excessive remuneration could come under one of many forms of what La Porta et al 
describe as “expropriation of minority shareholders and creditors by the controlling 
shareholders”84. This is a corollary of the agency problem described by Jensen and 
Meckling, and means that insiders use the profits of the firm to benefit themselves 
                                                          
80
 Agency problem is often seen as the problem that arises from the fact that power in the company is placed 
in the hands of people who are not the owners of the company. According to Keay and Loughrey, the agency 
theory of the company requires board accountability in order to deal with the agency problem. However, they 
bemoan the lack of clarity on the meaning of accountability in the field of corporate governance despite the 
widespread use of the term. They argue that one effect of this is that it blurs the debate about board 
accountability. Andrew Keay and Joan Loughrey “The Framework for Accountability in Corporate Governance” 
[2015] 35 Legal Studies, 2, 252-289.  
81
 O Williamson, Mechanisms of Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p 253. Quoted in Keay and 
Loughrey, op cit pages 258-9. 
82
 M. Dooley ‘Two models of corporate governance’ (1992) 47 Bus Law 461 at 468; J Roberts ‘Trust and control in 
Anglo-American systems of corporate governance: the individualizing and socializing effects of processes of 
accountability’(2001) 54 Hum Rel 1547 at 1548. Quoted in Keay and Loughrey, op cit.   
83
 JC Coffee ‘New myths and old realities: the American Law Institute faces the derivative action’ (1993) 48 Bus Law 1407 at 
1425. Quoted in Keay and Loughrey, op cit. 
84
 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, “Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance” (2000) 58 Journal of Financial Economics, 3-27, at p. 4   
Company Lawyer – 0144-1027 
 
rather than return the money to the outside investors. According to La Porta et al 
who take a cynical view of insider motives, when the legal system provides good 
protection for investors, one of the few options that insiders can resort to is to 
overpay themselves.85  
On reflection, empirical evidence on directors’ remuneration bear the 
hallmarks of the agency theory more than any other corporate theory. As the 
preceding analysis reveals, despite regulatory reform both in the form of soft law and 
hard law to ultimately reduce agency costs, directors’ remuneration has continued to 
rise, overall, and shareholders have continued to approve remuneration packages in 
the AGM. The surprising approval by shareholders of directors’ remuneration 
packages in the midst of controversies over directors’ pay underlines the fact that 
whatever hype directors’ remuneration may cause, the subject is a contractual one to 
be determined ultimately by the parties to the contract in pursuit of their respective 
interests. External regulation has a limited intrusive force. It can only provide a 
framework within which the parties to the agency contract can exercise their 
contractual rights in pursuit of their respective interests, but ultimately the decision is 
theirs. And, in this contract, shareholders as principals, almost invariably exercise 
their contractual and statutory rights to vote in favour of the remuneration packages 
presented to them in the AGMs by their agents, the directors. What then is the fuss – 
one might ask?  
The FRC itself acknowledges that despite increasing regulation to improve 
transparency and accountability, the inconsistent alignment between executive 
remuneration and performance and between the remuneration of senior executives 
and employees has continued unabated.86 This acknowledgement underscores the 
agency theory basis of directors’ remuneration and the limited effect that external 
regulation can have in this area of corporate governance. 
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Conclusion 
Corporate governance issues are perennial and they will remain so for as long as 
companies continue to fail. And, companies will sometimes fail as admitted by the 
Kingman Review.87 Corporate failure cannot therefore, be interpreted as a sign of 
corporate governance failure. What is certain, however, is that corporate failure 
provokes corporate governance reform. Most of the corporate governance reforms in 
the UK, both in the form of soft law and hard law, have been in response to these 
corporate failures. If anything, this paper has revealed that the UK corporate world is 
hardly a dull or an idle place. It is a vibrant beehive that is reverberating with a near-
incessant flurry of corporate governance reforms matched equally by corporate 
failures and the concomitant fallouts. In fact, some of the reforms and corporate 
activities discussed in this paper took place while the paper was being written. One 
might be tempted to ask if the reforms are working, but that is another subject. The 
following passionate statement made by Rachel Reeves MP, to a session of auditors 
facing the Commons Business, Energy and Industry Strategy (BEIS) Committee in 
October 2019 captures the theme: 
How many more company failures, how many more egregious cases of 
accounting do we need? We've had BHS, Carillion and Patisserie Valerie, and 
now we've had Thomas Cook. How many more do we need before your 
industry opens its eyes and recognises that you're complicit in all of this and 
you need to reform? I think the conclusion policy makers will take from today 
is that we can't rely on you to do the right thing and legislation is needed to 
have a tougher regulator. We need tougher regulation because your industry 
is not willing to make the changes needed.88 
A question that is worth asking is if the above statement and the replacement of the 
FRC with ARGA is an admission that industry self-regulation has failed and if this 
gives credence to the argument that industry cannot be trusted to self-regulate. This 
too, is another subject. 
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The three corporate governance issues examine in this paper underpin the 
fact that by virtue of its inter-disciplinary nature, corporate governance intersects 
various subject areas including law (both soft law and hard law) and corporate legal 
theory, all supported by empirical data. It was seen above that the problem of 
directors’ remuneration is best explained by the agency theory. However, it can be 
surmised from the analysis in this paper that, overall, corporate governance is a 
nexus of contracts involving an intense interplay between the various stakeholders 
involved in this giant, invisible and amorphous entity called the company. As seen 
earlier, the agency theory provides a suitable theoretical home for the issue of 
directors’ remuneration which essentially involves a contract between the directors 
and shareholders. This contract is a part of the bigger nexus of contracts upon which 
the company is thought to be based.89 The above speech by Honourable Reeves to 
the session of auditors at the Commons Committee is an indictment on auditors that 
they have failed to perform their role in the contract between them and the company 
– a contract which is yet another part of the bigger nexus of contract. It follows that 
corporate governance reform often involves separate regulatory instruments dealing 
with these separate contractual relationships which weaved together provide an 
effective system of governance. For example, as seen earlier, the Companies 
(Directors’ Remuneration Policy and Directors Remuneration Report) Regulation 
2019 deals with directors’ remuneration which concerns the agency relationship 
between shareholders and directors. The Statutory Auditors, Third Country Auditors 
and International Accounting Standards (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 
deal with auditors, which concerns the agency contract between the company and 
the auditors. Only occasionally is there a single regulatory framework such as the 
Code or the Companies Act 2006, which deals with all or most of the parties in this 
nexus of contract and the issues involved. And even then, a perusal of the 
instruments would reveal that they carry the hallmarks of the nexus of contract 
theory. For example, the main principles of the Code deal with different contracts, 
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such as the contract between the shareholder and the directors, the contract with the 
auditors, etc.  
 
 
 
